When transport systems change, markets can shift faster than intuition expects. Electric drivetrains are replacing an entire system built around engines, maintenance and recurring fuel purchases. The transition will vary by region, but declining costs, industrial scale and energy security are reshaping the economics.

New vehicle sales show the direction of travel, while the fleet changes slowly as vehicles are replaced. I track both alongside the cost of buying and running an EV and charging infrastructure.

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Updated 13 November 2026 | EV Curve Futurist

1. From engines to systems

A battery-electric vehicle (BEV) replaces the combustion engine, exhaust and fuel system with an electric drivetrain. Electric motors offer much greater energy efficiency and fewer mechanical servicing requirements. Software, connected charging and integration with the electricity system create further opportunities.

That does not mean adoption is automatic. Upfront prices, charging access, grid connections, financing, vehicle choice and policy still affect how quickly different markets can move.

2. The economics: battery costs, scale and repeatability

Cost curves are the foundation of my transport thesis. Battery manufacturing scale, LFP chemistry, stronger competition and repeated production improve the economics of EVs. BloombergNEF reported average lithium-ion battery-pack prices of US$108/kWh across applications in 2025, with BEV packs averaging US$99/kWh. The price varies considerably by region and chemistry. Source: BloombergNEF.

Cheaper batteries give manufacturers more room to reduce vehicle prices, improve margins or offer larger packs. That can expand the number of vehicle segments where BEVs compete on purchase price and total cost of ownership.

Historical battery prices and forecast assumptions

The historical BloombergNEF battery-price series in the graphic below is expressed in real 2025 US dollars. Its 2015 and 2025 endpoints, US$475 and US$108/kWh, imply a decline of about 77% overall, or 13.8% compounded annually. The projected 2026–2035 line deliberately uses a more conservative 5% annual real-price decline: approximately US$84/kWh in 2030 and US$65/kWh in 2035. It is an EV Curve Futurist illustration, not a BloombergNEF forecast. BNEF’s 2025 price survey provides the reported history.

Battery economics infographic: historical global average battery pack prices fall from US$475/kWh in 2015 to US$108/kWh in 2025; a 5% yearly real-price decline illustration reaches approximately US$84/kWh in 2030 and US$65/kWh in 2035.
Battery pack economics, 2015–2035: BloombergNEF historical pack prices through 2025, restated to real 2025 US$/kWh; 2026–2035 is a conservative illustration assuming 5% annual real-price declines, not an official forecast.

Even modest continued cost declines could strengthen the EV advantage. Battery pack prices are only part of the cost of a vehicle, and the timing will vary by region, chemistry, model and market conditions. But the direction of battery economics helps explain the EV adoption curves in the Base Case and Energy Shock scenarios that follow.

There is no universal battery price at which every vehicle category suddenly flips. What matters is the total cost and quality of the vehicle, including energy, financing, servicing, residual value and charging convenience. In segments where EVs gain a clear economic advantage, adoption can accelerate rapidly.

Cost always wins, but the timing depends on the conditions in each market.

3. BEVs, PHEVs and hybrids

The charts below distinguish BEVs (fully battery-electric cars), PHEVs (plug-in hybrids, including range-extenders where counted in the source data) and non-plug-in cars (petrol, diesel and conventional hybrids). In this model, NEV means BEV + PHEV.

PHEVs can reduce fuel consumption when charged and driven electrically, but retain an engine and fuel system. My Base Case assumes a 2026 sales dip and an earlier peak than my previous forecasts. That model assumption must not be read as a verified full-year global 2026 result. Any reported slowdown needs a dated dataset and a consistent market scope.

The distinction between the scenarios matters. In the model, annual PHEV sales peaked in 2025 at 7.20 million. In the Base Case forecast, they decline overall from that point, despite a small rebound in 2027. In the Energy Shock Case, higher oil-price pressure temporarily extends PHEV demand, with a modelled peak of 7.50 million in 2029. Both scenarios converge to 3.64 million PHEV sales by 2035 as BEVs become increasingly competitive. These figures are scenario assumptions, not independent PHEV industry forecasts.

EV Curve Futurist line graph of annual global PHEV sales 2015–2035 in Base Case and Energy Shock scenarios, showing different peak years and convergence by 2035.
PHEVs as a bridge: the Base Case peaks in 2025, while Energy Shock temporarily extends growth to a 2029 peak. Both pathways subsequently decline.
4. The second-hand EV effect

New-car sales are only the leading edge of electrification. As used EVs reach lower price points, the benefits of cheaper energy and reduced routine servicing become accessible to more drivers. Battery condition, warranties, affordable repair and charging access will determine how far that effect spreads.

Sales are flow. Fleet is stock. A country can reach a majority of plug-in new-car sales long before a majority of its vehicles on the road are plug-ins.

5. Electric trucks and oil displacement

The impact extends beyond passenger cars. Freight fleets make purchasing decisions around utilisation, downtime, payload, energy costs and total cost of ownership. China’s rapidly growing electric-truck market is an important early test of the economics, but charger availability, financing and local routes still matter.

The IEA Global EV Outlook 2026 documents the expansion of electric trucks in China. Heavy vehicles carry much larger batteries and can have high daily utilisation, so electrification has implications for diesel demand, battery materials and charging infrastructure.

Truck adoption is not included in the passenger-car sales tables. The separate illustrative oil comparison uses assumed electric shares of 30% of new medium/heavy truck sales in the Base Case and 55% in Energy Shock by 2030. Its 5.5 million and 6.8 million barrels/day values are author case illustrations for year-end 2030, not IEA forecasts or results that can be reproduced from new-sales shares alone.

EV Curve Futurist graphic comparing illustrative 2030 combined passenger-car and medium/heavy-truck oil displacement: 5.5 million barrels per day Base Case and 6.8 million Energy Shock.
Illustrative oil-displacement scenarios for passenger cars and medium/heavy trucks combined, at year-end 2030. These are EV Curve Futurist modelling outputs, not observed displacement or IEA forecasts.

Reproducing an oil-displacement estimate requires a fully specified annual car and truck stock model, retirements, mileage, displaced fuel consumption and PHEV electric-driving shares. The public passenger-car tables and truck-sales endpoints do not disclose all those inputs. The graphic should therefore be read as an illustrative sensitivity, not an independently validated forecast.

6. Safety, practical constraints and consumer confidence

EV safety, battery durability, charging access and repairability deserve evidence rather than anecdotes. Comparing fire rates requires consistent definitions, vehicle ages and exposure measures. Improved battery management and chemistry can reduce risks, while safe charging practices and emergency response remain essential.

7. China, energy security and the global transition

China’s manufacturing ecosystem and EV sales scale are reshaping the global market. But the case for electrification is also growing in countries that want to reduce imported-oil dependence and exposure to volatile fuel prices. Electricity can increasingly be produced domestically from solar, wind, hydro and other sources.

Ethiopia made history in January 2024. It became the first country to effectively stop imports of petrol and diesel cars, not just promise to phase them out decades later. The policy restricted access to foreign currency for importing combustion vehicles and used import barriers to make those purchases largely unworkable. It did not ban existing petrol or diesel vehicles from the roads, and limited exemptions remained. IEA policy record; Ethiopian Energy Outlook 2025.

Why take such a radical step? Ethiopia spends billions of US dollars importing petroleum, draining scarce foreign currency and leaving its economy exposed to oil-price shocks. Meanwhile, it has substantial domestically generated hydropower and a relatively small existing vehicle fleet. Rather than build a vast new petrol-dependent transport system, it has an opportunity to electrify as transport demand grows. That makes the 2024 decision a globally significant test of energy sovereignty and technological leapfrogging, particularly for oil-importing developing countries. It is still an experiment, with vehicle affordability, reliable power, charging and repairs presenting real barriers. JICA research.

For a closer examination of the policy, economics and challenges, read Ethiopia’s Leapfrog: Skipping the Oil Age. This 15-minute documentary on Ethiopia’s EV transition shows the changes on the ground.

The IEA estimated that roughly one in four new cars sold worldwide was electric in 2025, but plug-ins made up only about 5% of the on-road passenger-car fleet. That gap between new sales and the total fleet is central to interpreting the transition. Source: IEA Global EV Outlook 2026.

Fleet baseline: The model uses 75 million plug-in cars in 2025 and the IEA’s rounded estimate of about 5% of all passenger cars. This implies approximately 1.5 billion cars globally (75 million ÷ 0.05). It is a modelled starting point, not an independently verified exact global fleet count. Forecast fleet shares assume 2% annual growth in the total car fleet.


The data behind the transition

The following charts and tables test two distinct EV Curve Futurist scenarios. Both use the same historical vehicle data for 2015–2025 and the same total number of global passenger cars sold in every forecast year. What changes is the powertrain mix, not the total size of the market.

The Base Case models sustained cost-driven adoption. The Energy Shock Case tests what happens if oil-price volatility and energy-security concerns accelerate substitution towards plug-ins. Neither scenario is an official IEA or BloombergNEF forecast. Explore the scenario tables and sources in the Data Hub.

Plug-ins become the majority: the Base Case

The first graphic focuses on new-car market share. In the Base Case, BEVs and PHEVs together pass 50% of new global car sales in 2029, rise to 63.0% in 2030 and approach saturation by 2035.

Plug-ins become the majority, Base Case global passenger car sales shares 2016–2035
Base Case: plug-ins take the majority of new-car sales in 2029. New-sales share changes far faster than the existing fleet.
8. Base Case: cost-driven disruption

My Base Case assumes continued improvement in battery economics, manufacturing scale, charging and vehicle choice without requiring an exceptional energy crisis. The BEV share grows while PHEVs peak and gradually decline.

It projects 28.7% plug-in share in 2026, 63.0% in 2030 (40.00 million BEVs and 5.83 million PHEVs), and 98.8% by 2035. However, the on-road EV fleet would be only around 14.5% electric in 2030 under the fleet assumptions described below.

Base Case: annual passenger-car sales and on-road fleet

EV Curve Futurist Base Case table showing global passenger car sales and on-road EV fleet, 2015–2035.
Base Case: global passenger-car sales, on-road EV fleet and battery metrics, 2015–2035. Historical model data through 2025; EV Curve Futurist estimates from 2026.
The Electric Crossover Base Case annual global passenger car sales 2015–2035
Base Case: annual plug-in sales exceed non-plug-in sales in 2029; by 2035 the model reaches 86.84 million plug-ins versus 1.06 million non-plug-ins.
9. Energy Shock Case: faster electrification, not more cars

What happens if sustained oil-price pressure, fuel uncertainty and the economic advantage of EVs combine to accelerate purchasing decisions? In this scenario, the number of passenger cars sold in each year is identical to my Base Case. Only the split between BEV, PHEV and non-plug-in changes.

The model allows BEV growth to rise from 25% in 2027 to 35% in 2028 and 40% in 2029, before slowing as the market approaches saturation. By 2030, plug-ins reach 84.0% of new-car sales: 53.77 million BEVs and 7.35 million PHEVs, or approximately 15.29 million more plug-in sales than the Base Case. By 2035, share reaches 99.3%.

The Energy Shock Case is deliberately more aggressive, not inevitable. Reaching it would depend on sustained economic pressure, enough supply and charging capacity, and strong uptake across many different markets.

Energy Shock Case: annual passenger-car sales and on-road fleet

EV Curve Futurist Energy Shock table showing global passenger car sales and on-road EV fleet, 2015–2035.
Energy Shock: global passenger-car sales, on-road EV fleet and battery metrics, 2015–2035, using the same overall new-car market as the Base Case.
The Electric Crossover Energy Shock global passenger car sales 2015–2035
Energy Shock: plug-ins reach 84.0% of new-car sales in 2030, versus 63.0% in the Base Case, with the same total global car market.
10. Why the on-road fleet changes more slowly

Even when 84% of new cars sold are plug-ins, most existing cars can still run on petrol or diesel. Under these scenarios, the projected on-road EV fleet share reaches approximately 14.5% in 2030 and 32.9% in 2035 in the Base Case, versus 16.3% and 36.0% in Energy Shock. These are modelled, not measured, future fleet shares.

The 2030 Base Case illustrates the gap. Approximately 240 million plug-in cars would represent 14.5% of an estimated 1.66 billion passenger cars on the road. The remaining 85.5%, or roughly 1.42 billion non-plug-in cars, would still rely on liquid fuels. Even some plug-in hybrids can continue burning petrol. This is why a rapid new-sales crossover does not immediately eliminate oil demand.

EV Curve Futurist 2030 Base Case graphic showing 240 million plug-in cars out of approximately 1.66 billion passenger cars globally, or 14.5% on-road fleet share.
Sales are flow; fleet is stock. This 2030 fleet split is derived from the model’s inferred 2025 global fleet and 2% annual total-fleet growth, not an independently measured 2030 vehicle count.
11. Battery stock, materials and the grid

Growing EV fleets will affect electricity demand, batteries, charging infrastructure, lithium and other materials. The battery-stock figures in the tables are illustrative modelling outputs, calculated from estimated EV fleets and assumed average battery sizes. They are not directly measured installed capacity. A stronger model would track BEVs and PHEVs by vehicle vintage, pack size and retirements.

Managed charging, grid flexibility and bidirectional capability could make transport an active part of the wider energy system. But higher EV sales do not by themselves establish a specific quantity of lithium required.

12. Autonomy and transport as a service

Electrification and software-defined vehicles can support smarter fleet operation and potentially greater vehicle utilisation. Autonomy could make those changes more profound, but safe deployment, regulatory approval, economics and consumer trust remain uncertain. Autonomous transport effects are not built into the car-sales scenarios.


The thesis, distilled

Transport electrification is not simply about replacing one kind of car with another. It is a shift from recurring fuel purchases towards electricity, more efficient drivetrains and increasingly connected energy systems. The transition is likely to be uneven, but scale and cost advantages can be powerful. I follow deployment, performance and ownership costs to assess market changes. The practical test is whether these systems deliver affordable, dependable mobility for more people, across everyday journeys and commercial operations.

Cost remains a central driver. Infrastructure, policy, manufacturing capacity and consumer choice shape how quickly that advantage translates into adoption.

Sources & resources

The figures for 2015–2025 are rounded historical model inputs; forecasts for 2026–2035 are authored by EV Curve Futurist. NEV = BEV + PHEV. Non-plug-in includes conventional hybrids. The historical total-car-market denominator contains reconstructed figures and is not an exact uniform OICA passenger-car registrations series. Both scenarios share annual total new-car sales. Future EV fleet shares assume an inferred 2025 global fleet of approximately 1.5 billion cars, 2% yearly total-fleet growth and negligible EV retirements. Battery-stock results multiply estimated EV fleet size by assumed fleet-wide average pack size; they are illustrative and should not be used as confirmed physical battery capacity or precise materials-demand forecasts. Historical and policy reference sources do not endorse these scenario projections.

Sources and further reading